Charles C. Camosy is one of the most prolific
writers amongst moral theologians today. Since
earning his Ph.D. at the University of Notre
Dame fifteen years ago, he has published
several books and scores of peer-reviewed and
popular articles, as well as numerous blog
pieces and opinion essays, including for the
Washington Post and other national periodicals.
Recent books include Resisting Throwaway
Culture: How a Consistent Life Ethic Can Unite
a Fractured People (New City Press, 2019)
and, coauthored with Alisha N. Mack, DNP,
Bioethics for Nurses: A Christian Moral Vision
(Eerdmans, 2022). A versatile theological
ethicist, Camosy has also published books and
articles on ecological and animal ethics, just
war theory and nonviolence, politics and civil
discourse, and many other contemporary issues.
Most of his attention, though, focuses on
trends and questions in health care ethics.
At the time he authored and published Losing
Our Dignity: How Secularized Medicine Is
Undermining Fundamental Human Equality,
he was Associate Professor of Theological and
Social Ethics at Fordham University; now he
is Professor of Ethics and Medical Humanities at the Creighton University Health Science
Campus in Phoenix, Arizona. Camosy is not
content to write solely to fellow scholars; much
of his work aims at reaching wider ecclesial and
public audiences. In addition to well-known
church-related publishers, such as Eerdmans
and Liturgical Press, he writes for New City
Press, which is connected with the Focolare
movement and seeks to provide “books and
resources that enrich the lives of people and
help all to strive toward the unity of the entire
human family.”1
Accordingly, Camosy’s
audience for Losing Our Dignity is not limited
to fellow bioethicists, moral theologians,
academicians, and health care professionals.
This is an accessible and engaging read for
students, parishioners, and the wider public.
The book is comprised of seven chapters that
are bookended between an introduction and a
conclusion. Its main thesis is that “mainstream
medical ethics and mainstream medicine” no
longer view all human beings as equal “in their
very essence” (11-12) and sharing “a common
nature that bears the image and likeness of God”
(19). Instead, influential medical practitioners
and bioethicists increasingly distinguish
between “human beings” and “persons,”
with the latter being associated with certain abilities such as self-awareness, rationality,
communication, productivity, and the like.
When someone lacks the wherewithal to be
regarded a “person,” they then are viewed as
deficient in dignity and no longer deemed to
be deserving of the health care that most of us
take for granted. This is exasperated by limited
medical and financial resources, especially as
more Americans are aging and on the verge
of becoming “a new, large, and growing set of
victims: human beings with late-stage dementia”
(15).
In the first chapter, Camosy offers a declension
narrative, from the origins of medicine and
medical ethics within the Church to their
secularization in recent decades. Whereas
Christian health care and bioethics cared for the
sick and disabled, “especially the untouchable
sick and disabled discarded by the dominant
culture” (23), now the tables have turned so
that the dominant culture has gained the upper
hand. Camosy highlights recent articles by
philosophers and bioethicists as evidence of
this shift: Timothy Murphy’s “In Defense of
Irreligious Bioethics”; Ruth Macklin’s “Dignity
is a Useless Concept”; and Steven Pinker’s “The
Stupidity of Dignity.” Yet, Camosy claims that
“it is impossible to practice a totally secularized
medicine” since “theological concepts
nevertheless find their way into the design and
practice of medicine in various ways” (39). This
is a contention that surfaces a number of times
throughout the rest of the book: secular health
care practitioners and bioethicists, whether
they are aware of it or not, still have “their own
particular understanding of the good to bear on
these questions” (42). The good, for them, is
autonomy, and this is what is eclipsing human
dignity.
The second chapter considers the case of
thirteen-year-old Jahi McMath, a Black girl
who reached puberty in 2014 even as the state
of California declared her to be brain dead. For
Camosy, medical science has failed to stay in
its lane in determining death, a question that
is instead philosophical and theological (47).
He accuses privileged physicians of exhibiting
an ableist attitude toward human beings with
catastrophic brain injuries. Camosy adds that
the problem concerning the determination
of death is compounded by the increasing
demand for organ donors. I must admit that
when I suffered a traumatic brain injury eleven
years ago, I shared Camosy’s concerns. At the
same time, Camosy is not a vitalist (nor am I),
holding that everything must be done to keep
someone alive regardless of their circumstances.
With advance directives or a surrogate decisionmaker, Camosy rightly notes here and in
subsequent chapters that such treatment
may be forgone or withdrawn if deemed
extraordinary. However, human beings with
catastrophic brain injury and their loved ones
should not be pressured or coerced to do so.
Furthermore, Camosy recommends a healthy
dose of epistemic humility and erring on the
side of caution, concerning human beings with
catastrophic brain injuries, a point he makes
also in subsequent chapters.
In the third chapter, Camosy discusses Terri
Schiavo and the so-called persistent, or
chronic, vegetative state. He notes that “a
good percentage of people thought to be in
PVS are, in fact, conscious and aware” (71)
and that “many patients thought to be in
a vegetative state can and do recover” (73).
As in the previous chapter, Camosy makes
clear “that, even in circumstances where
there is consciousness, there will be times that life-sustaining treatment can and even
should be withdrawn (especially when the
patient can communicate wishes for no
extraordinary treatment)” (76). Here, too,
Camosy prescribes the precautionary principle:
since we “now know that about 20 percent of
diagnosed patients can be coaxed into varying
levels of conscious states,” and that we were
wrong about that 20 percent “who we now
acknowledge should have the moral and legal
equality of persons,” we should humbly exercise
caution about the other 80 percent, since at
some point, “with new technologies, we [may]
find that another chunk of those 80 percent can
also regain consciousness” (87).
The fourth chapter concentrates on the status
of prenatal human beings, abortion, and Roe
v. Wade. Camosy argues that paternalism
rather than feminism fueled that Supreme
Court decision. In contrast, he urges respect for
the fundamental human equality of pregnant
women (109). At the time he was writing,
before the Dobbs decision in 2022, Camosy
expressed his hope that “US practices and law
will be pushed to be consistent” (108). But,
post-Dobbs, there seems to me that there is
a lack of careful, consistent thinking amongst
many politicians about the dignity of both
the unborn and women, especially those
women who are experiencing life-threatening
circumstances during their pregnancies. I agree
with Camosy that “we must absolutely refuse
to think of dignity and equality as a zero-sum
game where one population can be treated
equally only at the expense of another” (111);
however, at times there are tragic circumstances
in which difficult decisions must be made. Just
as in other chapters note when forgoing or
withdrawing extraordinary treatment can be
morally justified, this one might have at least acknowledged when an indirect abortion might
be, too.
In the fifth chapter Camosy deals opens with
the 2018 case of newborn Alfie Evans and
neurodegenerative disease.2
In Camosy’s view,
although the medical professionals claimed
that they acted in Alfie’s “best interests,” their
assumptions about “quality of life” were the
main driving force. As in other chapters, there
were conflicting visions of the good (125) in
this case, as well as other social factors such
as paternalism and classism. Again, Camosy
invokes the precautionary principle: “Here’s
the bottom line: we just aren’t sure about a lot
of things related to what we think we know
about the brain and how what we think we
know relates to the (current and/or future)
consciousness of a patient with a devastating
neurological disease or injury” (119). He
also resumes noting that the removal of life-sustaining treatment is sometimes justifiable,
but “in this case there are multiple reasons to
think this is not what was going on” (121).
The sixth chapter turns to human beings with
late-stage dementia and neurodegenerative
diseases such as Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s,
multiple sclerosis (MS) and amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis (ALS). Camosy worries that
philosopher Dan W. Brock’s view, that human
beings with severe dementia have no claim to
life-sustaining health care, will become more
prevalent (150). Writing during the early
months of the COVID-19 pandemic, Camosy
observes that persons with dementia were
especially vulnerable and received inadequate
care, evidence again of the “powerful ableist
forces” that “determine who is in and who is
out,…which lives are part of a community of
equals and which are outside that community” (154-155), a “deadly medical ableism” (158).
In the seventh chapter, Camosy attempts to
engage secular progressives by appealing to
their sense of social justice and equality. His
medium-term strategy here is to try to “find
an overlapping consensus” (173) with those
who “may not follow a general commitment
to fundamental equality consistently, but they
do have one” (174). They are, like many of
my undergraduate students who are culturally
if not practicing Christians, disquieted about
ableism, classism, racism, and consumerism.
They vehemently denounce any hint of
discrimination or injustice, especially toward
the vulnerable. For students and readers who
rightly excoriated US police for killing unarmed
Black men such as George Floyd, Camosy tries
to make plain that “the fundamental value
during this racial justice moment is also the
fundamental value at the heart of this book”
(175). In my experience, such a strategy can
be persuasive. Put differently, just as police
and the wider public often exhibit an implicit
bias toward persons of color, so too perhaps
do medical practitioners and bioethicists have
an implicit bias of ableism and “quality of
life” that unjustly colors their treatment of (or
lack of treatment of) human beings who lack
certain abilities. In addition, Camosy hopes
that those who adhere to Aristotelian or similar
philosophical perspectives should be amenable
to what he is advocating. He thinks that
genuine dialogue about “first principles, chief
loves, transcendental values, visions of the good,
and ultimate concerns” is possible (178, 181).
In the short-term, Camosy invites fellow
Christians to be “a counterculture of
responsibility, encounter, and hospitality” in
contrast to “a throwaway culture which discards or otherwise marginalizes human non-persons
as having lost their fundamental dignity” (163).
He encourages more volunteering in nursing
homes, encounters between younger and older
generations, making decisions that allow us
to care for aging parents and other family
members, and other practices that will build
and reinforce such a counterculture.
In the conclusion, Camosy asks, “And what if
we fail?” And he answers, “If cultural change
isn’t on the way, I propose that religious
organizations and institutions mobilize for a
massive, all-hands-on-deck response of our own”
(185). Religious orders, such as the Sisters of
Life and Little Sisters of the Poor, as he notes,
had such an impact in the past. I would add
that something similar has been occurring to
address the climate crisis, with women religious
leading the way. Maybe they, or comparable
groups of Christian laypersons and health care
professionals, can establish and operate in the
long-term new hospitals, clinics, and nursing
homes. Of course, doing so will require a lot
of will as well as effort and money. Camosy
suggests, though, that such a countercultural
witness might be attractive to new converts.
TOBIAS WINRIGHT, Ph.D.
Saint Patrick's Pontifical University
Maynooth, Ireland
[email protected]
Charles C. Camosy, Losing Our Dignity:
How Secularized Medicine Is Undermining
Fundamental Human Equality (Hyde
Park, NY: New City Press, 2021), 222 pp.,
paperback, $22.95.
ENDNOTES
- For more on New City Press and the Focolare movement,
see https://www.focolaremedia.com/about.
- See “Moral Lessons from the Life of Alfie Evans: Two
Ethical Perspectives,” Health Care Ethics USA (July
2, 2018) for reflections from Tobias Winright, Jason
Eberl, and Gerald Coleman, https://www.chausa.org/
publications/health-care-ethics-usa/archives/issues/
summer-2018/moral-lessons-from-the-life-of-alfie-evanstwo-ethical-perspectives.